foucault

The beginning of wisdom is in the discovery that there exist contradictions of permanent tension with which it is necessary to live and that it is above all notnecessary to seek to resolve.

-Andre Gorz, Farewell to the Proletariat

It is not difference which immobilizes us, but silence. And there are so many silences to be broken.

-Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider

The question of difference is at the forefront of discussions among feminists today. Of course, theories of difference are not
new to the women's movement. There has been much discussion  concerning the nature and status of women's differences from
men (for instance, biological, psychological, cultural). Theories of sexual difference have emphasized the shared experiences of
women across the divisions of race, class, age or culture. In such theories the diversity of women's experiences is often lumped
into the category "women's experience," or women as a class, presumably in an effort to provide the basis for a collective
feminist subject.

More recently, however, as a result of experiencing conflicts at the level of practice, it is the differences among women (for
instance, differences of race, class, sexual practice) that are becoming the focus of theoretical discussion. To be sure, Marxist
feminists have consistently recognized the significance of class differences among women, but other important differences cry
out for recognition. The question arises: do the differences and potential separations between women pose a serious threat to
effective political action and to the possibility of theory?

Perhaps the most influential and provocative ideas on the issue of difference in feminism are to be found in the writings of black,
leshian feminist poet and essayist Audre Lorde. In her work,  Lorde describes the ways in which the differences among women
have been "misnamed and misused in the service of separation and confusion."2 As a leshian mother and partner in an inter-
racial couple, she has a unique insight into the conflicts and divided allegiances which put into question the possibility of
unified women's movement. She has experienced the way in which power utilizes difference to fragment opposition. Indeed
this fragmentation can occur not only in groups but also within the individual. Hence, Lorde remarks: "I find I am constantly
being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying th'
other parts of self."3

Lorde claims that it is not the differences among women that separate us, but rather our "refusal to recognize those differ
ences, and to examine the distortions which result from our misnaming them and their effects upon human behavior anc
expectation."4 Thus, she appears to be saying that difference is not necessarily counter-revolutionary. She suggests that femi-
nists devise ways of discovering and utilizing their differences as a source for creative change. Learning to live and struggle with
many of our differences may be one of the keys to disarming the power of the white, male, middle-class norms which we have all internalized to varying degrees.

In what follows I shall elaborate on the notion of difference as resource and offer a sketch of some of the implications that
what I call a "politics of difference" might have for "revolutionary" feminist theory.5 In order to elucidate these implications I
shall turn to the writings of the social philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. It is my contention that despite the andro-
centrism in his own writings he too has recognized the ambiguous power of difference in modern society. He recognizes that
difference can be the source of fragmentation and disunity as well as a creative source of resistance and change.

My aim in this paper is twofold: ( 1 ) to turn to Foucault's work and method in order to lay out the basic features of a politics of
difference; and (2) to show how such a politics might be applied in the feminist debate concerning sexuality. In order to accomplish these aims I shall begin by contrasting Foucault's politics with two existing versions of revolutionary feminism, namely, Marxist and radical feminism. I have selected these two feminist frameworks because they contain the elements of traditional revolutionary theory that Foucault is rejecting.6 Other Foucauldian feminisms are developed by Morris and Martin.7

Foucault's Critique of Revolutionary Theory

It will be helpful to contrast Foucault's approach with Marxism, on the one hand, and radical feminism, on the other. Both
Marxism and radical feminism conceive of historical process as a dialectical struggle for human liberation. Both have turned to
history to locate the origins of oppression, and to identify a revolutionary subject. Yet, radical feminists have criticized
Marxism for its inability to give an adequate account of the persistence of male domination. Replacing the category of capi-
tal, radical feminists identify patriarchy as the origin of all forms of oppression. Hence, they view the struggles of women as a sex/class as the key to human liberation.

The recent intensification of feminist attention to the differences among women might be understood as a reaction to the
emergence of a body of feminist theory which attempts to represent women as a whole on the basis of little information about the diversity of women's experiences, to develop universal categories for analyzing women's oppression, and, on the basis of such analysis, to identify the most important struggles. When Audre Lorde and others speak of the importance of preserving and redefining difference, of discovering more inclusive strategies for building theory; when they speak of the need for a broad based, diverse struggle, they are calling for an alternative to a traditional revolutionary theory in which forms of oppression are either overlooked or ranked and the divisions separating women exacerbated. The question is: Are there radical alternatives to traditional revolutionary theory? As I have indicated, we can turn to Foucault for an alternative approach to understanding radical social transformation.

Foucault's is a radical philosophy without a theory of history. He does not utilize history as a means of locating a single revolu-
tionary subject, nor does he locate power in a single material base. Nevertheless, historical research is the central component
of his politics and struggle a key concept for understanding change. Accordingly, in order to evaluate the usefulness of Fou-
cault's methods for feminism, we must first understand the historical basis of his critique of traditional revolutionary theory.

Foucault's rejection of traditional revolutionary theory is rooted in his critique of the " juridico-discursive" model of power
on which it is based. This model of power underpins both liberal theories of sovereignty (that is, legitimate authority often codi-
fied in law and accompanied by a theory of rights) and Marxist theories which locate power in the economy and the state as an
arm of the bourgeoisie. The juridico-discursive model of power involves three basic assumptions:

1. Power is possessed (for instance, by the individuals in the state of nature, by a class, by the people).

2. Power flows from a centralized source from top to bottom (for instance, law, the economy, the state).

3. Power is primarily repressive in its exercise (a prohibition backed by sanctions).

Foucault proposes that we think of power outside the confines of state, law or class. This enables him to locate forms of power
that are obscured in traditional theories. Thus, he frees power from the domain of political theory in much the same way as
radical feminists did. Rather than engage in theoretical debate with political theorists, Foucault gives historical descriptions of
the different forms of power operating in the modern West. He does not deny that the juridico-discursive model of power
describes one form of power. He merely thinks that it does not capture those forms of power that make centralized, repressive
forms of power possible, namely, the myriad of power relations at the microlevel of society.

Foucault's own theory of power differs from the traditional model in three basic ways:

1. Power is exercised rather than possessed.

2. Power is not primarily repressive, but productive.

3. Power is analyzed as coming from the bottom up.

In what follows I shall outline Foucault's reasons for substituting his own view of power for the traditional one.

1. Foucault claims that thinking of power as a possession has led to a preoccupation with questions of legitimacy, consent and
rights. (Who should possess power? When has power overstepped its limits?) Marxists have problematized consent by introducing a theory of ideology, but Foucault thinks this theory must ultimately rest on a humanistic notion of authentic consciousness as the legitimate basis of consent. Furthermore, the Marxist emphasis on power as a possession has resulted in an effort to locate those subjects in the historical field whose standpoint is potentially authentic, namely, the proletariat. Foucault suspends any reference to humanistic assumptions in his own account of power because he believes that humanism has often served more as an ideology of domination than liberation.

For the notion that power is a possession Foucault substitutes a relational model of power as exercised. By focusing on the power relations themselves, rather than on the subjects related (sovereign-subject, bourgeois-proletarian), he can give an account of how subjects are constituted by power relations.

2. This brings us to the productive nature of power. Foucault rejects the repressive model of power for two reasons. First, he
thinks that if power were merely repressive, then it would be difficult to explain how it has gotten such a grip on us. Why
would we continue to obey a purely repressive and coercive form of power? Indeed, repressive power represents power in its most frustrated and extreme form. The need to resort to a show of  force is more often evidence of a lack of power. Second, as I have indicated, Foucault thinks that the most effective mechanisms of power are productive. So, rather than develop a theory of history and power based on the humanistic assumption of a presocial individual endowed with inalienable rights (the liberal's state of nature), or based on the identification of an authentic human interest (Marx's species being), he gives accounts of how certain institutional and cultural practices have produced individuals.

These are the practices of disciplinary power, which he associates with the rise of the human sciences in the nineteenth century.

Disciplinary power is exercised on the body and soul of individuals. It increases the power of individuals at the same time as
it renders them more docile (for instance, basic training in the military). In modern society disciplinary power has spread
through the production of certain forms of knowledge, such as the positivistic and hermeneutic human sciences, and through
the emergence of disciplinary techniques such as techniques of surveillance, examination and discipline which facilitate the pro-
cess of obtaining knowledge about individuals. Thus, ways of knowing are equated with ways of exercising power over individ-
uals. Foucault also isolates techniques of individualization such as the dividing practices found in medicine, psychiatry, criminol-
ogy, and their corresponding institutions, the hospital, asylum and prison. Disciplinary practices create the divisions healthy/
ill, sane/mad, legal/delinquent, which, by virtue of their authoritative status, can be used as effective means of normalization
and social control. They may involve the literal dividing off of segments of the population through incarceration or institution-
alization. Usually the divisions are experienced in the society at large in more subtle ways, such as in the practice of labeling one
another or ourselves as different or abnormal.

For example, in The History of Sexuality Foucault gives an historical account of the process through which the modern
individual has come to see herself as a sexual subject. Discourses such as psychoanalysis view sexuality as the key to self-under
standing and lead us to believe that in order to liberate ourselves from personality "disorders," we must uncover the truth of our
sexuality. In this way dimensions of personal life are psychologized, and thus become a target for the intervention of experts.

Again, Foucault attempts to show how these discourses, and the practices based on them, have played more of a role in the
normalization of the modern individual than they have in any liberatory processes. He calls for a liberation from this "govern-
ment of individualization," for the discovery of new ways of understanding ourselves, new forms of subjectivity.

3. Finally, Foucault thinks that focusing on power as a possession has led to the location of power in a centralized source. For
example, the Marxist location of power in a class has obscured an entire network of power relations "that invests the body,
sexuality, family, kinship, knowledge, technology. . ."8 His alternative is designed to facilitate the description of the many forms
of power found outside these centralized loci. He does not deny the phenomenon of class (or state) power, he simply denies that understanding it is most important for organizing resistance. As I have indicated, Foucault expands the domain of the political to include a heterogeneous ensemble of power relations operating at the microlevel of society. The practical implication of his model is that resistance must be carried out in local struggles against the many forms of power exercised at the everyday level of social relations.

Foucault's "bottom-up" analysis of power is an attempt to show how power relations at the microlevel of society make
possible certain global effects of domination, such as class power and patriarchy. He avoids using universals as explanatory concepts at the start of historical inquiry in order to prevent theoretical overreach. He states:
 

One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which
each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been-and continue to be-invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by even more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination. It is not that this global domination extends itself right to the base in a plurality of repercussions. . .9

In other words, by utilizing an ascending analysis Foucault shows how mechanisms of power at the microlevel of society
have become part of dominant networks of power relations. Disciplinary power was not invented by the dominant class and
then extended down into the microlevel of society. It originate outside this class and was appropriated by it once it revealed its
utility. Foucault is suggesting that the connection between power and the economy must be determined on the basis of specific
historical analysis. It cannot be deduced from a general theory. He rejects both reductionism and functionalism insofar as the
latter involves locating forms of power within a structure or institution which is self-regulating. He does not offer causal or
functional explanations but rather historical descriptions of the conditions that make certain forms of domination possible. He
identifies the necessary but not sufficient conditions for domination.

In short, Foucault's histories put into question the idea of a universal binary division of struggle. To be sure, such divisions
do exist, but as particular and not universal historical phenomena. Of course, the corollary of his rejection of the binary model
is that the notion of a subject of history, a single locus of resistance, is put into question.

Resistance

Despite Foucault's neglect of resistance in Discipline and Punish, in The History of Sexuality he defines power as dependent
on resistance.'° Moreover, emphasis on resistance is particularly evident in his more recent discussions of power and sexuality."
In recent writings Foucault speaks of power and resistance in the following terms:

Where there is power, there is a resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteri-
ority in relation to power.'2

I'm not positing a substance of power. I'm simply saying: as soon as there's a relation of power there's a possibility of
resistance. We're never trapped by power: it's always possible to modify its hold, in determined conditions and following a
precise strategy.'3

There are two claims in the above remarks. The first is the weaker claim that power relations are only implemented in cases where there is resistance. In other words, power relations only arise in cases where there is conflict, where one individual or group wants to affect the action of another individual or group. In addition, sometimes power enlists the resistant forces into its
own service. One of the ways it does this is by labeling them, by establishing norms and defining differences.

The second claim implied in Foucault's description of power is the stronger claim that wherever there is a relation of power
it is possible to modify its hold. He states: "Power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free."'4 Free
subjects are subjects who face a field of possibilities. Their action is structured but not forced. Thus, Foucault does not define
power as the overcoming of resistance. When restraining forces are overcome, power relations collapse into force relations. The limits of power have been reached.

So, while Foucault has been accused of describing a totalitarian power from which there is no escape, he denies that "there is
a primary and fundamental principle of power which dominates society down to the smallest detail. '' 15 At the same time he claims that power is everywhere. He describes the social field as a myriad of unstable and heterogeneous relations of power. It is an open system which contains possibilities of domination as well as resistance.

Foucault describes the social and historical field as a battlefield, a field of struggle. Power circulates in this field and is
exercised on and by individuals over others as well as themselves. When speaking of struggle, he refuses to identify the subjects of struggle. When asked the question: "Who is struggling against whom?" he responds:

This is just a hypothesis, but I would say it's all against all. There aren't immediately given subjects of a struggle, one the proletariat, the other the bourgeoisie. Who fights against whom? We all fight against each other. And there is always
within each of us something that fights something else.'6

Depending on where one is and in what role (for instance, mother, lover, teacher, anti-racist, anti-sexist) one's allegiances
and interests will shift. There are no privileged or fundamental coalitions in history, but rather a series of unstable and shifting
ones.

In his theory of resistant subjectivity Foucault opens up the possibility of something more than a history of constructions
or of victimization. That is, he opens the way for a historical knowledge of struggles. His genealogical method is designed to
facilitate an "insurrection of subjugated knowledges." These are forms of knowledge or experience that "have been disqualified
as inadequate to their task, or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down in the hierarchy, beneath the
required level of cognition or scientificity.''l7 They include the low-ranking knowledge ("popular knowledge") of the psychiat-
ric patient, the hysteric, the imprisoned criminal, the housewife, the indigent. Popular knowledge is not shared by all people, "but it is, on the contrary, a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity.''l8

The question whether some forms of resistance are more effective than others is a matter of social and historical investigation
and not of a priori theoretical pronouncement. The basis for determining which alliances are politically viable ought not to
be an abstract principle of unity, but rather historical and contextual analysis of the field of struggle. Thus feminism can mobilize
individuals from diverse sites in the social field and thereby use differences as a resource.l9

Genealogy as a Form of Resistance

Foucault introduces genealogical critique as his alternative to traditional revolutionary theory. He attempts to liberate us from
the oppressive effects of prevailing modes of self-understanding inherited through the humanist tradition. As one commentator
suggests, for Foucault, "Freedom does not basically lie in discovering or being able to determine who we are, but in rebelling
against those ways in which we are already defined, categorized, and classified."20 Moreover, the view that a theory of history
should enable us to control history is part of the Enlightenment legacy from which Foucault is attempting to "free" us. For him,
there is no theory of global transformation to formulate, no revolutionary subject whose interest the intellectual or theoreti-
cian can represent. He recommends an alternative to the traditional role for the intellectual in modern political struggles. He
speaks of the "specific intellectual" in contrast to the "universal intellectual," that is, the "bearer of universal values" who repre-
sents the enlightened consciousness of a revolutionary subject.

The specific intellectual operates with a different conceptionof the relation between theory and practice:

Intellectuals have gotten used to working, not in the modality of the "universal," the "exemplary," the "just-and- true-for
all," but within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them (housing,
the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and social relations).21

. . . . .

Focusing attenton on specfic stuatons may lead to more concrete analyses of particular struggles and thus to a better under-
standing of social change. For example, Foucault was involved in certain conflicts within medicine, psychiatry and the penal
system. He devised ways for prisoners to participate in discussions of prison reform. His history of punishment was designed
to alter our perspectives on the assumptions that inform penal practices.

In part, Foucault's refusal to make any universal political, or moral, judgments is based on the historical evidence that what
looks like a change for the better may have undesirable consequences. Since struggle is continual and the idea of a power-free
society is an abstraction, those who struggle must never grow complacent. Victories are often overturned; changes may take
on different faces over time. Discourses and institutions are ambiguous and may be utilized for different ends.

So Foucault is in fact pessimistic about the possibility of controlling history. But this pessimism need not lead to despair.
Only a disappointed traditional revolutionary would lapse into fatalism at the thought that much of history is out of our control.
Foucault's emphasis on resistance is evidence that he is not fatalistic himself, but merely skeptical about the possibilities of
global transformation. He has no particular utopian vision. Yet, one need not have an idea of utopia in order to take seriously
the injustices in the present. Furthermore, the past has provided enough examples of theoretical inadequacy to make Foucault's
emphasis on provisional theoretical reflection reasonable.

In short, genealogy as resistance involves using history to give voice to the marginal and submerged voices which lie "a little
beneath history"-the voices of the mad, the delinquent, the abnormal, the disempowered. It locates many discontinuous and
regional struggles against power both in the past and present. These voices are the sources of resistance, the creative subjects
of history.22

Foucault and Feminism:
Toward a Politics of Difference

What are the implications of Foucault's critique of traditional revolutionary theory, his use of history and his analysis of power
for feminism? I have called Foucault's politics a politics of difference because it does not assume that all differences can be
bridged. Neither does it assume that difference must be an obstacle to effective resistance. Indeed, in a politics of difference,
difference can be a resource insofar as it enables us to multiply the sources of resistance to particular forms of domination and
to discover distortions in our understandings of each other and the world. In a politics of difference, as Audre Lorde suggests,
redefining our differences, learning from them, becomes the central task.

Of course, it may be that Lorde does envision the possibility of some underlying commonality, some universal humanity, which
will provide the foundation for an ultimate reconciliation of our differences. Her own use of the concept of the "erotic" might be
understood as an implicit appeal to humanism.23 As we have seen, Foucault's method requires a suspension of humanistic
assumptions. Indeed, feminists have recognized the dangers of what Adrienne Rich refers to as "the urge to leap across feminism to 'human liberation.' ''24 What Foucault offers to feminism is not a humanist theory, but rather a critical method which is thoroughly historical and a set of recommendations about how to look at our theories. The motivation for a politics of difference is the desire to avoid dogmatic adherence to categories and assumptions as well as the elision of differences to which such dogmatism can lead.

In conclusion, I want to illustrate the value and limitations of Foucault's politics of difference by bringing it to bear on a recent
discussion of difference within feminism, namely, the sexuality debate. This debate has polarized American feminists into two
groups, radical and libertarian feminists.25 The differences being discussed threaten to destroy communications between them.
Hence, an understanding of their differences is crucial at this conjuncture in American feminism.

Radical feminists condemn any sexual practices involving the "male" ideology of sexual objectification which, in their view,
underlies both male sexual violence and the institutionalization of masculine and feminine roles in the patriarchal family. They
call for an elimination of all patriarchal institutions in which sexual objectification occurs, such as pornography, prostitution,
compulsory heterosexuality, sadomasochism, cruising, adult/child and butch/femme relations. They substitute an emphasis
on intimacy and affection for the "male" preoccupation with sexual pleasure.

In contrast, libertarian feminists attack radicals for having succumbed to sexual repression. Since radicals believe that sex
as we know it is male, they are suspicious of any sexual relations whatsoever. Libertarians stress the dangers of censoring any
sexual practices between consenting partners and recommend the transgression of socially acceptable sexual norms as a strat-
egy of liberation.

What is remarkable about these debates from the perspective of a Foucauldian politics of difference is the extent to which the
two camps share similar views of power and freedom. In both camps, power is represented as centralized in key institutions
which dictate the acceptable terms of sexual expression, namely, male-dominated heterosexual institutions whose elements are
crystallized in the phenomenon of pornography on the one hand, and all discourses and institutions that distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate sexual practice (including radical feminism) thereby creating a hierarchy of sexual expresson, on the other.
Moreover, both seem to regard sexuality as a key arena in the struggle for human liberation. Thus, for both, understanding the
truth about sexuality is central for liberation.

In addition, both operate with repressive models of power. Radical feminists are in fact suspicious of all sexual practices
insofar as they view sexual desire as a male construct. They think male sexuality has completely repressed female sexuality and
that we must eliminate the source of this repression, namely, all heterosexual male institutions, before we can begin to construct
our own. Libertarians explicitly operate with a repressve model of power borrowed from the Freudo-Marxist discourses of Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. They recognize that women's sexual expression has been particularly repressed in our society and advocate women's right to experiment with their sexuality. They resist drawing any lines between safe and dangerous, politically correct and politically incorrect sex. Radical feminists accuse libertarians of being male identified because they have not problematized sexual desire; libertarians accuse radicals of being traditional female sex-prudes.

There are other similarities between the two camps. In the first place, as Ann Ferguson has pointed out, both involve universalist theories of sexuality, that is, they both reify "male" and "female" sexuality and thus fail to appreciate that sexuality is a historically and culturally specific construct.26 This is problematic insofar as it assumes that there is some essential connection between gender and sexual practice. An historical understanding of sexuality would attempt to disarticulate gender and sexuality and thereby reveal the diversity of sexual experiences across gender as well as other divisions. For example, Rennie Simpson suggests that African American women's sexuality has been constructed differently from white women's.27 They have a strong tradition of self-reliance and sexual self-determination. Thus, for American  black women, the significance of the sexuality debates may be different. Indeed, the relationship between violence and sexuality takes on another dimension when viewed in the light of past uses of Iynching to control black male sexuality. And consider the significance of women of color's emphasis on issues such as forced sterilization or dumping Depo Provera on third-world countries over that of white American feminists on abortion on demand.28 Yet, radical feminists still tend to focus on dominant culture and the victimization of women. Ann Snitow and Carol Vance clearly identify the problem with this approach when they
remark:

To ignore the potential for variations (in women's sexual expression) is inadvertently to place women outside the cul-
ture except as passive recipients of of ficial systems of symbols. It continues to deny what mainstream culture has always tried
to make invisible-the complex struggles of disenfranchised groups to grapple with oppression using symbolic as well as
economic and political resistance.29

Rather than generalize on the basis of the stereotypes provided by "dominant culture," feminists must explore the meaning of
the diversity of sexual practices to those who practice them, to resurrect the "subjugated knowledge" of sexuality elided within
dominant culture.

Secondly, both radicals and libertarians tend to isolate sexuality,  as the key cause of women's oppression. Therefore, they
locate power in a central source and identify a universal strategy for seizing control of sexuality (for instance, eliminate pornography, transgress sexual taboos by giving expression to sexual desire). Both of these analyses are simplistic and reductionist. While it is important, sexuality is simply one of the many areas of everyday life in which power operates.

In sum, the critique of the sexuality debates developed out of a politics of difference amounts to (1) a call for more detailed re-
search into the diverse range of women's sexual experiences; and  avoiding analyses that invoke universal explanatory categories or a binary model of oppression and that thereby overlook the many differences in women's experience of sexuality.

Although a politics of difference does not offer feminists a morality derived from a universal theory of oppression, it need
not lapse into a form of pluralism in which anything goes. On the basis of specific theoretical analyses of particular struggles,
one can make generalizations, identify patterns in relations of power and thereby identify the relative effectiveness or ineffec-
tiveness, safety or danger of particular practices. For example, a series of links have been established between the radical feminist strategy of anti-pornography legislation and the New Right's efforts to censor any sexual practices that pose a threat to the family. This is not to suggest that the anti-pornography movement is essentially reactionary, but rather that at this time it may
be dangerous. Similarly, one ought not to assume that there is any necessary connection between transgression of sexual taboos
and sexual liberation. Denying that censorship is the answer to patriarchal sexual oppression is not tantamount to endorsing
any particular form of transgression as liberatory.

In a feminist politics of difference, theory and moral judgments are geared to specific contexts. This need not preclude systematic analysis of the present, but it does require that our categories be provisional. As Snitow and Vance point out: "We need to live with the uncertainties that arise along with the change we desire."30 What is certain is that our differences are ambiguous; they may be used either to divide us or to enrich our politics. If we are not the ones to give voice to them, then history suggests that they will continue to be either misnamed and distorted, or simply reduced to silence.31